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Buying Fish, Bollinger, and Baker
Danielle Dick McGeough
Louisiana State University
dmcgeo1@tigers.lsu.edu
The “marketplace of ideas” theory has been described as one of the most 
powerful metaphors in the free speech tradition and has played a central 
role in how the Supreme Court has ruled on free speech cases. Yet, this 
metaphor has been heavily criticized for influence on hate speech and 
pornography legislation. The purpose of this essay is to introduce three 
free speech theories that challenge the marketplace theory and discuss 
how, if adopted, these theories would or would not legally accommodate 
the positions of Critical Race Theorists and anti-pornography feminists. To 
do so, I explain the marketplace of ideas theory and its critiques. Next, I 
give a brief explanation of Critical Race Theorists’ and anti-pornography 
activists’ perspectives on freedom of speech. I then present theories from 
Stanley Fish, Lee Bollinger, and Edwin Baker, applying each theory to racist 
speech and pornography. I conclude with a discussion on whether adopting 
new theories solves the confusion that exists under the marketplace of ideas 
paradigm. Do Fish, Bollinger, or Barker’s theories provide insight into how 
law ought to be applied to difficult cases, such as those pertaining to racist 
speech and pornography?
In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reinforced a foundational 
concept that had and would continue to permeate free speech dialogue for 
years to come: the “marketplace of ideas.”1 In his dissent in Abrams v. United 
States Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reasoned, “The best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can 
be carried out.” The rationale that the search for truth is best advanced by 
the free trade of ideas “is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in free speech 
tradition” (Smolla 6). 
1 Holmes’ conceptualization of the marketplace metaphor has had a significant influ-
ence on contemporary notions of freedom of speech. However, the marketplace met-
aphor can be traced to ancient origins, namely the Socratic Method. In Areopagitica, 
John Milton explicates the importance of an open exchange of ideas. Adam Smith 
introduces the invisible hand metaphor in The Wealth of Nations to explain the self- 
regulating nature of the marketplace. Others such as John Stuart Mill and Thomas 
Jefferson are linked to the metaphor as well. 
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Although the marketplace theory is widely accepted and habitually 
used, it has also been robustly debated. Critical Race Theorists and anti-
pornography activists have been particularly critical of the marketplace of 
idea’s influence on law. In regard to racist speech, Charles Lawrence III 
argues, “The American marketplace of ideas was founded with the idea of 
the racial inferiority of non-whites as one of its chief commodities, and ever 
since the market opened, racism has remained its most active in trade” (468). 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, an anti-pornography feminist and legal scholar, 
insists, “The marketplace rewards the powerful, whose views then become 
established as truth” (Only Words 102). MacKinnon alleges that the powerful 
use pornography, and as a legal category of “speech,” it pronounces and 
produces the subordination of women (Only Words 88). 
The purpose of this essay is to introduce three free speech theories that 
challenge the marketplace theory and discuss how, if adopted, these theories 
would or would not legally accommodate the positions of Critical Race 
Theorists and anti-pornography feminists. To do so, I explain the marketplace 
of ideas theory and its critiques. Next, I give a brief explanation of Critical 
Race Theorists’ and anti-pornography activists’ perspectives on freedom of 
speech. I then present theories from Stanley Fish, Lee Bollinger, and Edwin 
Baker, applying each theory to racist speech and pornography. I chose to focus 
on theories from Fish, Bollinger, and Baker, despite being somewhat dated, 
due to their continuing importance and influence in legal theory. I conclude 
with a discussion on whether adopting new theories solves the confusion 
that exists under the marketplace of ideas paradigm. Do Fish, Bollinger, or 
Baker’s theories provide insight into how law ought to be applied to difficult 
cases, such as those pertaining to racist speech and pornography?
The Marketplace
How the Marketplace has been Bought 
The marketplace theory is based on the belief that, in a democracy, 
free speech is necessary for an informed citizenry. The theory proposes 
that ideas compete with one another, people evaluate and analyze these 
ideas, and that over time arrive at truth. The theory assumes: 1) truth 
is objective, 2) we are rational people who examine information, and 
3) over time, ideas are winnowed down. Weak, false, or bad ideas do 
not survive and truth is revealed. According to this theory, if the best 
ideas or solutions are to be discovered, government interference must be 
discouraged. The objectives of the marketplace of ideas are to achieve 
truth, improve decision-making, create an informed electorate, and 
enhance debate in a democracy. 
Although the marketplace of ideas theory is not the sole justification 
for free speech, the marketplace of ideas theory proliferates in judicial 
opinions and courts’ justifications for First Amendment tests (Baker 7). 
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The marketplace metaphor arises in cases as justices struggle to determine 
whether obscene, offensive, inaccurate, and/or dangerous speech is essential 
to the marketplace of ideas. Roth v. United States argues that obscene 
materials do not deserve protection from the First Amendment because 
obscenity is “utterly without redeeming social importance.” Other cases 
rely on the marketplace metaphor to determine if false or offensive speech 
ought to be protected by the First Amendment. New York Times v. Sullivan 
makes clear that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that 
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing 
space’ that they need in the marketplace of ideas.” Furthering this notion, 
the “clear and present danger” test articulated in Shneck v. United States 
declares that if danger is not present, then there is time for the marketplace 
of ideas to reveal fallacies. In regards to pernicious speech, the case 
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie determined that 
the Nazi Party should be allowed to march through a Jewish community 
“precisely because officials anticipate that the marketplace will reject it” 
(Ingber 22-23). Finally, some judicial decisions have been rendered to make 
sure individuals have equal access to information in the marketplace. The 
“fairness doctrine” was created to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace 
of ideas” (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC). When applied to law, the 
marketplace of ideas theory makes clear the solution to bad speech is to 
let the marketplace of ideas, not the government, sort it out. 
Marketplace of Ideas for Sale
Despite the marketplace theory’s frequent usage, it has been vigorously 
criticized. Skeptics of the marketplace of ideas have leveled six main 
critiques, claiming the marketplace of ideas: 1) is a flawed metaphor, 
2) falsely assumes people have equal access to the marketplace, 3) reinforces 
the status quo, 4) misunderstands how humans interact with information, 
5) falsely assumes truth exists, and 6) overlooks the length of time it takes 
to arrive at the truth. 
First, the marketplace metaphor itself has received various critiques. 
Many challenges of the marketplace theory have focused on the analogy 
between it and laissez-faire economics. Nearly all economies need 
government regulation of markets. In fact, “today’s economists widely admit 
that government regulation is needed to correct failures in the economic 
market caused by real world conditions” (Ingber 5). Still, the marketplace 
theory is used to argue that ideas must be exchanged in a competitive free 
market with few, if any, regulations. 
One reason critics urge regulation of the marketplace is to achieve the 
desired distribution of ideas. Paul H. Brietzke explains that an economic 
approach to the marketplace of ideas places a price on speech. People that 
are unable to pay (in money, time, education, or other scarce recourses) have 
less power to speak and this, in turn, makes the poor poorer. Brietzke uses the 
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example of the New York Stock Exchange. The poor do not get to participate 
in the New York Stock Exchange, and, therefore, have less influence on 
political and economic policies that are typically debated in that arena. 
Critics maintain that regulations in the market are needed to decrease 
monopolization and promote equal access to the marketplace of ideas. Today, 
access to the media is essential to anyone wishing to disseminate his or her 
views widely. Edwin Baker explains:
The extreme concentration of ownership of major mass 
media in the United States, as well as the large corporate 
advertisers’ power implicitly to set norms for acceptability 
of form and content and sometimes to control specific 
publication or broadcast decisions, and the typically 
less organized status of those outside the existing power 
structure are among the factors that predictably cause 
these market failures to reinforce corporate power and 
the status quo. (38)
Even if an individual or group gains access to the media, owners and managers 
still control what information reaches the public. Thus, controversial ideas 
are less likely to be disseminated.
Not only do certain groups have greater access to the marketplace, it 
seems that most people favor the presently dominant groups (Baker 15). 
People tend to prefer the status quo to change. Derek E. Bambauer explains 
that people are “reluctant to give up what they have even when presented 
with attractive alternatives” (695). This is because people prefer to reduce 
uncertainty and stick with the status quo even if the alternative may be the 
wiser decision. Furthermore, humans “often become locked into their initial 
mental framework, and tend to adopt simple beliefs such as stereotypes rather 
than using more accurate information” (Bambauer 708). Consequently, the 
marketplace may serve to reinforce individual egos, uphold existing views, 
and do little to challenge existing ideas. 
The marketplace of ideas theory makes several other inaccurate 
assumptions about how humans interact with information. Bambauer uses 
research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics to prove that 
the way in which humans process information is contrary to the marketplace 
assumptions. The marketplace of ideas, for example, suggests that it is 
necessary for unrestrained speech to enter the market in order to promote 
wise decision-making. However, because humans must select and process 
information, too much information may make separating truth from falsehood 
more difficult. “Simply adding information to the environment—without 
regard to its relevance, quality, or presentation—increases demands on 
consumers’ scarce attention and may lead them to shift their analysis 
and decisions in ways inconsistent with prior expressed preferences.” 
Additionally, how information is heuristically framed influences what we 
choose to select. Bambauer explains, “The weakness of the marketplace of 
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ideas is the consumers who shop within it. Our perceptual filters, cognitive 
biases, and heuristics mean that we do not consistently discover truth and 
discard false information” (698, 709). 
The fact that cognitive biases influence people’s reaction to information 
calls the marketplace’s emphasis on objective truth into question. If 
truth is objective, then “socioeconomic status, experience, psychological 
propensities, and societal roles should not influence an individual’s concept 
of truth” (Ingber 15). Stanley Ingber explains that most people today do 
not believe in an objective truth, and “as long as people have differing 
experiences, there is little guarantee that any society can agree on what is 
‘true’” (26). Therefore, the marketplace of ideas is less likely to reveal the 
truth and more likely to reveal what is a culture’s sense of what is “true” or 
what is “best.”
Finally, the marketplace theory overlooks the length of time it takes to 
arrive at the truth. For example, it may take years for an accepted idea to 
be analyzed by the marketplace, only to discover that it is false. Frederick 
Schauer insists, “even if a populace is not likely to accept some false idea, 
great harm can nevertheless be produced by the false idea’s side effects (28). 
Therefore, even if an objective truth were to exist, a lot of damage may be 
done before that truth is discovered. 
Hate Speech and Pornography
Hate Speech
Audrey P. Olmsted defines Critical Race Theory (CRT) as “an attempt 
made by minority group law professors to improve the position of nonwhites 
with respect to law and society” (323). CRT insists speech acts cause racism 
and “solutions to problems resulting from racism require the use of language 
to reshape reality” (Olmsted 324). Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence 
III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw, the authors of the 
1993 book Words that Wound, became the leaders of the CRT movement 
after Harvard University denied students’ requests to hire a nonwhite person 
to teach a course on racism (Matsuda et. al.). These four lawyers developed 
a theory that recognizes how the legal system enforces racism. 
One legal perspective CRT challenges is the marketplace of ideas. 
CRT points out that racism is not rational or objective, creates an unequal 
marketplace, and is a form of worthless speech that fails to contribute to 
the marketplace of ideas. CRT maintains that racist speech is not rational 
and does not promote the unbiased process of evaluating information that 
the marketplace requires. Instead, racism is embedded into our thought 
processes, “At some level, no matter how much both victims and well-
meaning dominant-group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in 
our minds as an idea that may hold some truth” (Matsuda et. al. 25). Charles 
R. Lawrence III critiques the marketplace of ideas in detail:
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But it is not just the prevalence and strength of the idea of 
racism that make the unregulated marketplace of ideas an 
untenable paradigm for those individuals who seek full and 
equal personhood for all. The real problem is that the idea 
of the racial inferiority of nonwhites infects, skews, and 
disables the operation of a market (like a computer virus, 
sick cattle, or diseased wheat). It trumps good ideas that 
contend with it in the market. It is an epidemic that distorts 
the marketplace of ideas and renders it dysfunctional.  
Racism is irrational. Individuals do not embrace or reject 
racist beliefs as the result of reasoned deliberation. For 
the most part, we do not even recognize the myriad ways 
in which the racism that pervades our history and culture 
influences our beliefs. But racism is ubiquitous. We are all 
racists. Often we fail to see it because racism is so woven 
into our culture that it seems normal. In other words, most 
of our racism is unconscious. (77)
Lawrence III goes on to argue that as long as racism pervades society there 
are some people who will be considered “less deserving” because they are 
considered “racially inferior” (78). This corrupts the effectiveness of the 
marketplace of ideas theory.
According to CRT as articulated by Matsuda et. al., the marketplace of 
ideas is also rendered useless due to the silencing power of racism: “When 
the Klan burns a cross of a Black person who joined NAACP or exercised the 
right to move to a formerly all-white neighborhood, the effect of this speech 
does not result from the persuasive power of an idea operating freely in the 
market.” Racism prohibits equal participation in the marketplace, and society 
has nothing to gain by allowing certain members of society to be excluded 
from the marketplace. They argue, “When individuals cannot or choose not 
to contribute their talents to a social system because they are demoralized 
or angry, or when they are actively prevented by racist institutions from 
fully contributing their talents, society as a whole loses” (79, 93).  Richard 
Delgado argues that the First Amendment functions to provide individual 
self-fulfillment, obtain truth, increase participation in decision-making, 
and balance between stability and change. Racism stifles individual self-
fulfillment, prohibits certain members of society to voice their opinions, 
and “dulls the moral and social senses of its perpetrators even as it disables 
its victims from fully participating in society” (Matsuda et. al. 108, 109). 
Delgado compares racist speech to obscenity, arguing that racist speech is 
worthless and, therefore, unnecessary to protect.
Pornography
Similar to these Critical Race Theorists, legal scholar Catherine A. 
MacKinnon argues that there is a battle between freedom of speech and 
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freedom of equality, and currently the free market subdues freedom of 
equality. MacKinnon asserts “the First Amendment has grown as if a 
commitment to speech were no part of a commitment to equality and as 
if a commitment to equality had no implications for the law of speech.” 
MacKinnon’s main critique of First Amendment speech theory is that 
it ignores the role of power in the marketplace of ideas. “Speech theory 
does not disclose or even consider how to deal with power vanquishing 
powerlessness,” MacKinnon states; rather, “it tends to transmute this into 
truth vanquishing falsehood, meaning what power wins becomes considered 
true” (Only Words 71, 78).
Sex and sex equality are areas where power becomes a primary concern. 
Troubled with how pornography is legally defined as a category of speech, 
MacKinnon describes pornography as “a means through which sexuality 
is socially constructed, a site of construction, a domain of exercise. It 
constructs women as things for sexual use and constructs its consumers 
to desperately want women to desperately want possession and cruelty 
and dehumanization” (“Sexuality” 327). Pornography quells women’s 
participation in the marketplace, which reinforces the status quo and keeps 
those in power powerful. MacKinnon defines pornography as:
The graphic sexually explicit subordination of women 
through pictures and/or words that also includes one 
or more of the following: (a) women are presented 
dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; 
or (b) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy 
humiliation or pain; or (c) women are presented as sexual 
objects experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest, 
or other sexual assault; or (d) women are presented as 
sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or 
physically hurt; or (e) women are presented in postures or 
positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or (f) 
women’s body parts—including but not limited to vaginas, 
breasts, or buttocks—are exhibited such that women 
are reduced to those parts; or (g) women are presented 
being penetrated by objects or animals; or (h) women are 
presented in scenarios of degradation, humiliation, injury, 
torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or 
hurt in context that makes these conditions sexual. (Only 
Words 121-22)
MacKinnon recommends that this definition of pornography be adopted 
so that people who are harmed by pornography can sue for group defamation, 
which would be a criminal charge. Taking this approach to pornography 
allows people to “talk to each other, rather than buy and sell each other as 
ideas.” Under MacKinnon’s model of expression, the law will “have as great 
a role in providing relief from injury to equality through speech and in giving 
44
equal access to speech as it now has in disciplining its power to intervene in 
that speech that manages to get expressed” (Only Words 102, 109).
Stanley Fish and Literary Theory
Stanley Fish, a Professor of Humanities and Law, applied literary theory 
to law. In There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing Too, 
Fish maintains that legal documents such as judicial opinions are texts, 
just as a poem, novel, or play is a text, and should be interpreted as such. 
Contrary to the marketplace assumption of an objective truth, Fish claims 
an objective text does not exist. Rather than argue that texts are inherently 
indeterminate or subjective, Fish claims the meaning of a text is found within 
“interpretive communities,” where the reader is a member. Fish defines an 
interpretive community as:
Not so much a group of individuals who shared a 
point of view, but a point of view or way of organizing 
experience that shared individuals in the sense that its 
assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and 
stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the content 
of the consciousness of community members who were 
therefore no longer individuals, but insofar as they were 
embedded in the community’s enterprise, community 
property. (Doing 141)
Fish’s definition of interpretive community implies that individuals are 
not autonomous beings capable of choosing among competing ideas. Instead, 
people are “inescapably bound by the modes of thought made available by 
the interpretive communities to which they belong” (Bunker 70). Just as 
in any given community rules regulate speech, in the legal setting judges 
interpret laws, not objectively, but according to the meaning derived from 
interpretive communities.
For Fish, absolute free speech cannot exist, because, in every given 
community, certain speech is not allowed. According to Fish, it is commonly 
assumed that all speech is free, and then which speech should not be allowed 
is determined. However, Fish suggests we first determine which form of 
speech should not be permitted, and then free speech is what is left over. In 
other words, we literally “carve out the space in which expression can then 
emerge.” To support this argument, Fish cites Aeopagitaica where Milton 
blatantly excludes Catholics from the right to toleration and free expression. 
He purports that Milton’s description is not an anomaly. Although today 
people may not extirpate Catholics from First Amendment protection, some 
may argue that Nazis, child molesters, or enemy combatants should not be 
protected by the First Amendment. Fish states, “Speech, in short, is never 
a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts of some 
assumed conception of the good” (There’s No Such Thing 103, 104). In other 
words, in any given community, rules regulate speech.
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Because existing guidelines influence how speech is regulated, Fish 
contends that theory in practice is useless. In Fish’s opinion, judges do 
not need theories to guide their decisions on a case, because “an agent so 
embedded would not need anything external to what he [sic] already carried 
within him [sic] as a stimulus or guide to right—that is, responsible—action; 
in short, he [sic] would not need a theory” (Fish, Doing 386). Interpretive 
communities have rules that guide their decisions regarding First Amendment 
legislation, rendering external theories useless. 
Literary Theory and Hate Speech
Three aspects of Fish’s literary theory are relevant when debating 
hate speech legislation. First, Fish’s claim that interpretive communities 
determine meaning allows little room for personal agency. He maintains 
that pure expression rarely exists because it is “always in danger of being 
compromised by the urgings of special interest communities,” and “the 
very act of thinking of something to say… is already constrained… by the 
background context within which the thought takes place” (Fish, There’s 
No Such Thing 108). A special interest community may be an academic 
community, a shopping mall community, or an office community (for 
example). If, in any of these communities, people do not have agency 
because they are bound by the modes of thought made available by the 
interpretive communities, can an individual be held responsible for a 
racist comment? If an individual cannot act independently and instead is 
an extension of the community, is the interpretive community responsible 
for making space for racist expression?2
Second, Fish’s concept of interpretive communities complicates 
individual’s ability to make unbiased judgments. He views individuals, 
including judges, as an extension of the interpretive community. He writes:
People cling to First Amendment pieties because they 
do not wish to face what they correctly take to be the 
alternative. That alternative is politics, the realization that 
decisions about what is and is not protected in the realm of 
expression will rest not on principle or firm doctrine but 
on the ability of some persons to interpret—recharacterize 
or rewrite—principle and doctrine in ways that lead to the 
protection of speech they want heard and the regulation of 
speech they want heard and the regulation of speech they 
want silenced. (There’s No Such Thing 110)
2 Fish’s position is not unlike the position Judith Butler lays out in Excitable 
Speech. She argues, “One speaks a language that is never fully one’s own, but that 
language only persists through repeated occasions of that invocation” (140). 
Butler supports Fish’s claim that interpretive communities make it difficult for an 
individual to solely be held responsible for racist speech. In fact, this is in part 
why Butler discourages judicial remedies for harmful speech.
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Fish narrows the possibility for individual autonomy and leaves little room 
for individual reflection and creativity. Because people are incapable of 
thought detached from the values held by their interpretive community, Fish 
argues community’s ideals, not theoretical principles, govern decisions on 
First Amendment legislation. 
Fish believes that many legal distinctions, such as the speech/action 
division, are inconsistent because judges make decisions based on the 
interpretive community values to which they cling.3 “Despite what they 
say,” Fish contends, “courts are never in the business of protecting speech…
they are in the business of classifying speech” (There’s No Such Thing 106). 
Critical Race Theorists argue the courts have classified speech in a way that 
perpetuates racism.  
It is likely Fish would agree with CRT’s argument that the value of 
freedom of expression threatens the value of equality. If a specific interpretive 
community agrees that racist speech threatens that community’s purpose, 
regulation of speech may be necessary. Fish is open to the possibility of 
campus speech codes, but is reluctant to apply restrictions on hate speech 
in all situations (There’s No Such Thing 107). In place of constitutional hate 
speech regulation, Fish suggests we “consider in every case what is at stake 
and what are the risks and gains of alternative courses of action” (There’s 
No Such Thing 111). Does this mean that each community would have 
different laws regarding hate speech? What happens if a visitor breaks the 
community’s regulations? How is an interpretive community determined? 
Or is the concept of interpretive communities not that far from considering 
time, place, and manner restraints on speech?
Literary Theory and Pornography
If literary theory is difficult to apply to hate speech, then its application 
to pornography laws is even more complicated. Fish concedes that words 
can be injurious and that pornography can have harmful effects. Although 
he is critical of how our legal system currently justifies its responses to 
pornography, he does not offer suggestions on how to respond to this type 
of speech. The situation becomes even more dismal when one accepts that 
judges will always have biases when making decisions on anti-pornography 
cases. According to Fish, we must abandon the neutral principals that guide 
law because they make it difficult for people to see differences that matter, 
such as those between pornography and the statue of David. Fish recognizes 
an individual’s ability to interpret a text is constrained by the interpretive 
communities they belong to; however, he does not explain what happens 
3 Legally, it is difficult to distinguish between speech and action. For example, 
Critical Race Theorists argue racist speech is an act and therefore is punishable by 
law as violent action. Symbolic actions, such as burning the flag, are also 
protected as freedom of speech. Thus legally, speech may be considered action and 
action considered speech. 
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when one interpretive community places power over another. According to 
MacKinnon, pornography is in part successful because those in power use 
pornography in a way that sustains inequality between the sexes. If a powerful 
interpretive community endorses pornography, is it necessary to protect 
powerless members within that community? How are powerless members 
of a community protected from internalizing messages of inferiority and 
inequality?  If a community’s purpose is to subordinate particular members 
of the community, whose responsibility is it to protect those members?
Ultimately, Fish’s only suggestion is much like that of qualitative 
researchers: admit your biases and establish your positionality. Just as 
qualitative researchers disclose how their personal perspectives influence the 
way they interpret research, people who interpret law ought to reveal their 
subjective positions. Unfortunately, even though Fish provides interesting 
insights into our flawed assumptions regarding how law functions, he offers 
few concrete suggestions on how to apply his theory to law.  
Bollinger’s Tolerance Theory
Lee Bollinger developed tolerance theory in his 1986 book, The Tolerant 
Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America. Bollinger’s 
purpose was not to replace but to expand upon standard First Amendment 
theories. The theory rose out of concerns regarding classic free speech 
theories, such as the “marketplace of ideas,” that grounded their defense in 
the needs of democracy. He argues that extremist speech, like the Nazis’, 
cannot be justified with truth or knowledge-seeking as the value to be 
protected. Bollinger recommends we consider how legal restraints affect the 
broader social culture, rather than setting the boundary of legal restraints on 
speech. He believes that free speech serves to foster tolerance and provides 
an opportunity for citizens to exercise self-restraint (The Tolerant Society 
10). This shifts focus from the speaker to the listeners’ reactions towards 
the speech act. Bollinger defines tolerance as, “showing understanding or 
leniency for conduct or ideas…conflicting with one’s own” (The Tolerant 
Society 10). Bollinger’s emphasis on conduct is not accidental; he suggests 
that by “looking at what we count as harm in nonspeech” we can better 
“evaluate whether our thinking is askew in the speech area.” This supports 
Bollinger’s view that “the social value we can derive from free speech need 
not depend upon speech being unique or significantly different from other 
areas of interaction.” Speech is valuable because it creates a “capacity for 
tolerance” that helps us coexist in a heterogeneous society, not because 
speech creates truth (“The Tolerant Society” 981, 983).
Tolerating Hate Speech
Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, was distributing materials in 
Rochester, New Hampshire and preaching when a disturbance broke out. 
Upon arrest for violating the public laws of New Hampshire, Chaplinsky 
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cursed, “You are a damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist” to the city 
marshal (Chaplisky v. New Hampshire). When the landmark case Chaplisky 
v. New Hampshire reached the Supreme Court, Chaplinsky claimed that he 
was preaching “the true facts of the Bible,” and his treatment was “at the 
hands of the crowd.” By doing so, he attempted to remove himself from 
blame and shift responsibility for the disturbance to the crowd. The Supreme 
Court rejected Chaplinsky’s argument and convicted him. Had the Court used 
Bollinger’s tolerance theory to guide their decision, this landmark case may 
have had quite a different outcome. 
In the aforementioned case, the concept of “fighting words” was 
conceived. Although aspects of the “fighting words” doctrine have not 
survived, words that “inflict injury upon the listener” or tend to “incite 
an immediate breach of the peace” are still upheld (Chaplisky v. New 
Hampshire). Contrary to many of Bollinger’s arguments, “fighting words,” 
are beyond the scope of protection. Bollinger believes that extreme hate 
speech must be protected to support the larger moral lesson of tolerance. 
For example, Bollinger would agree with the decision made in National 
Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie to allow the Nazi Party to 
march through the Jewish community. However, Bollinger maintains that 
“fighting words,” libel, and obscenity are types of speech that when tolerated 
can bring injury to a community. It is not clear if Bollinger would agree that 
“fighting words” were used in Chaplisky v. New Hampshire. He is somewhat 
vague in his justifications for allowing the regulation of “fighting words” 
and does little to explain what should be done legally when “fighting words” 
and racist speech overlap.
Interestingly, Bollinger admits that hate speech sends a message of 
inferiority, hatred, and contempt. He even argues that racist speech is not 
much different than other racist acts that we prohibit (“The Tolerant Society” 
980). However, he believes that by restricting hate speech we forgo the 
valuable lesson of toleration. He explains:
Once we realize that speech can not only constitute bad 
behavior but can also cause palpable injury, we understand 
that speech can provide the context for exercising self-
restraint toward bad behavior as a means of demonstrating 
and developing a capacity to exercise appropriate self-
control when punishment is inflicted elsewhere. (“The 
Tolerant Society” 984)
On the surface, Bollinger appears to take an absolutist approach to hate 
speech, but he also makes several unpredictable exceptions. For example, 
while he disapproves of campus hate codes and finds tort actions for racist 
speech unnecessary, Bollinger does make space for regulations on libelous 
speech. In most situations, tolerance theory places an emphasis on tolerance 
that outweighs other values. The crucial question is whether tolerance theory 
could survive condemnation from Critical Race Theorists.
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First, Critical Race Theorists argue that racist speech goes beyond 
inciting violence; it is violence. Charles R. Lawrence III proclaims that 
the racial epithet “is invoked as an assault” (75). Therefore, is allowing 
racist speech creating “a capacity for tolerance” or creating a space for 
intolerance? If Bollinger advocates regulating “fighting words” because 
they can bring injury to a community, one must challenge that racist 
speech has the same effect. Mari J. Matsuda insists that “an absolutist First 
Amendment response to hate speech has the effect of perpetuating racism: 
Tolerance of hate speech is not tolerance borne by the community at large. 
Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay” (18). Still, 
one might claim that placing restrictions on racist speech or allowing tort 
actions for racial speech promotes toleration for people of all races and 
affirms “the right of all citizens to lead their lives free from attacks on their 
dignity and psychological integrity” (Delgado 110). A final concern with 
Bollinger’s approach to hate speech is the potential it creates for victim 
blaming to occur as responsibility is placed on the target of hate speech. If 
tolerance promotes victim blaming, it is doubtful that it would withstand 
legal muster. 
Tolerating Pornography?
As previously mentioned, Bollinger feels that obscenity exceeds the 
scope of First Amendment protection. Bollinger does not give a definition 
of obscenity but is clear that pornography is obscene material that needs 
to be regulated. In Morality of Consent, Alexander M. Bickel explains that 
pornography may be private but it still affects the community. He states, 
“Still what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon 
us all, wanted or not, for it constitutes our environment” (Bickel 74). 
Bollinger uses arguments such as Bickel’s to urge regulation of obscene 
materials. Bollinger also believes, “toleration of obscenity is unacceptable 
because it is too complicated psychologically to separate our attraction 
from rejection in any act of toleration.” He writes, “I see obscenity, in 
other words, as akin to fighting words, in the sense that the reason both 
are treated as exceptions to the first amendment is the sense that toleration 
is too freighted with messages of weakness and condonation” (Bollinger, 
“The Tolerant Society” 990). In general, Bollinger agrees with current laws 
regarding pornography regulation and obscenity. 
Bollinger’s desire to regulate pornography is not because pornography 
“causes” undesirable attitudes, but because the values pornography manifests 
are “an appropriate area for society to symbolically reject, through legal 
prohibition” (The Tolerant Society 184). That being said, Bollinger would 
likely embrace MacKinnon’s definition of pornography, because she makes 
clear the effects pornography has on the community at large. It is also likely 
that Bollinger would prohibit sexually explicit materials because of the 
psychological attraction people have to them.
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The application of tolerance theory is complicated due to inconsistencies 
between the need for tolerance and the need for regulations on materials that 
“may create confusion for what toleration would mean” (The Tolerant Society 
185). How does one distinguish between the danger obscenity imposes on a 
community and the damages imposed by racist speech? Do the arguments used 
to regulate pornography not also justify regulating the Nazis’ march through a 
Jewish community or a burning cross in an African American family’s yard?
Edwin Baker’s Liberty Theory
The development of “liberty theory” began with Edwin Baker’s 
publication of Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech. The theory “holds 
that the free speech clause protects not a marketplace, but rather an arena of 
individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions. Speech 
or other self-expressive conduct is protected not as a means to achieve a 
collective good but because of its value to the individual” (Baker 5). Baker 
vehemently argues that the classic marketplace of ideas theory is based on the 
flawed assumptions of objective truth and human rationality. He contends that 
“society should deny no one the right to speak” even if the speech does not 
contribute to the pursuit of truth (Baker 24). The two key values of the First 
Amendment, according to Baker, are “self-realization” and “participation in 
change” (48). Baker believes these values deserve constitutional protection 
because historically we commit to such values.
Freedom of speech is essential to individuals’ self-fulfillment and 
participation in change, and, therefore, speech need not be limited to 
words or phrases. Instead, free speech expands to include acts intended to 
communicate ideas (Baker 51–52). Baker explains that protesting war should 
be protected, because it “expresses and further defines the actor’s identity 
and contributes to his or her self-realization” (53). He also argues that speech 
needs to expand beyond words because some words are creative. For Baker, 
creative words are utterances that do what they claim to do; in other words, 
they are illocutionary in nature.  
Baker acknowledges that “All sorts of speech can harm others” but 
provides two reasons certain types of harm-causing speech ought to remain 
protected. First, as long as the harm-causing speech “does not itself interfere 
with another person’s legitimate decision-making authority” then the speech 
should be protected. He goes on to explain that “Outlawing acts of the speaker 
in order to protect people from harms” is to disrespect “the responsibility 
and the freedom of the listener” (Baker 55, 56). In other words, listeners have 
the ability to accept or reject what a speaker says; the restriction of speech 
disregards both the speaker and the listener’s autonomy. 
Liberty Theory and Hate Speech
Baker resists placing restrictions on individuals’ right to free speech. 
He does not make any explicit decisions on hate speech regulation, and his 
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theory argues both sides of the debate. For example, it is possible Baker carves 
out a small space for hate speech restrictions. He explains: “If the speaker 
manifestly disrespects and attempts to undermine the other person’s will and 
the integrity of the other person’s mental processes,” that speech is subject 
to prohibition (Baker 59). The authors of Words that Wound depict in great 
detail the effect hate speech has on a person’s mental processes. Delgado 
says, “The psychological effects of racism may also result in mental illness 
and psychosomatic disease” (91). CRT argues that racist speech greatly 
restricts self-realization. Baker’s theory justifies hate speech regulations by 
claiming the side effects of racist speech impede on individual liberties to 
self-realize and participate in change. 
However, Baker warns any prohibitions on such speech must be 
“narrow, precise, and defensible.” He claims, “people constantly invoke 
loosely formulated or inappropriately broad notions of coercion to justify 
regulation of various behavior, including speech, of which they disapprove” 
(Baker 56). One could use liberty theory to argue hate speech restrictions 
impair the speaker’s right to communicate personal values. Alternatively, 
one could also use liberty theory to argue that allowing hate speech inhibits 
the listener’s will and integrity. Although seemingly contradictory, both 
arguments are possible using liberty theory because Baker grants the speaker 
and the listener separate constitutional claims. However, Baker is absolute 
in his claim that speech does not wound. He explains, “Speech, unlike other 
behavior, is seldom thought of as physically violent or destructive.” In fact, 
he declares that harmful speech is “fraud, perjury, blackmail, espionage, and 
treason” (55, 60). Therefore, Baker is more likely to restrict racist speech that 
is simultaneously blackmail than, for example, a racial epithet.  
Liberty Theory and Pornography
Edwin Baker believes that pornography should be protected by the First 
Amendment. He firmly states that “laws should not be aimed at supplanting 
individual choice or commitment,” and “the first amendment should protect 
the listener’s or reader’s interest in obscenity” (Baker 77, 69). Baker explains 
his position:
Pornography may have more to do with ribald entertainment 
than with robust debate. If pornography degrades sexual 
intimacy or contributes to the subordination of women 
it does so more by being an undesirable activity and a 
corrupting experience, not by being an argument. From 
the perspective of liberty theory, however, pornographic 
communications, or even pornographic materials produced 
and pursued by a solitary individual contribute—whether 
in a good or bad fashion—to building the culture. (68)
According to Baker, restriction on pornography impedes individuals’ 
decision-making capabilities and constricts their ability to create the 
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world in a particular way. He uses a pollution analogy to explain his 
position. If a person reads pornography, he or she “presumably values 
this ‘polluting’ activity.” However, people do not buy cars because cars 
pollute the air; instead, this is “an undesired consequence” of the purchase. 
Baker argues that if a person does something for the sake of doing, such 
as viewing pornography, then that right should be protected because 
it contributes to self-realization. However, if there are side effects, as 
with buying a car, then this right can be restricted. Baker reasons, “Even 
with polluting behavior prohibited, the person (if she has sufficient 
recourses) typically can still engage in the aspect of the activity that she 
substantively values—only the cost or difficulty of the valued activity 
may have increased” (77, 78). 
MacKinnon would agree with Baker’s assumption that women are a 
resource that pornography must use. She states, “Pornography has to be done 
to women to be made.” However, for Baker the social cost of pornography is 
not as great as the cost of legal restrictions that allow the majority to suppress 
an individual’s values. Anti-pornography activists, however, would argue 
that Baker greatly underestimates the cost pornography places on society, 
especially women. One cost of pornography is that it limits women’s decision-
making capabilities. According to anti-pornography feminists, women do 
not get to choose whether to participate in the making of pornography, 
and they do not get to choose the message pornography communicates 
about women.  MacKinnon explains, “Both bodies of law [the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment] accordingly show virtually total insensitivity to 
the damage done to social equality by expressive means and a substantial 
lack of recognition that some people get a lot more speech than others” 
(Only Words 39, 72).  Baker might answer these arguments by claiming that 
anti-pornography activists have equally underestimated women’s individual 
autonomy. For Baker, it is more important to respect women’s responsibility 
and freedom to reject pornography. 
Conclusion
There are clearly flaws with the marketplace of ideas theory, but 
have Fish, Bollinger, or Baker offered more attractive alternatives? After 
exploring literary, tolerance, and liberty theory and applying all three 
theories to hate speech and pornography, it is apparent these theories 
struggle to provide clarity on how law ought to deal with difficult cases. 
This is not to suggest that we should revert to the marketplace of ideas 
theory. Instead, we must consider whether the search should continue for 
a more compatible metaphor and/or theory. It might be necessary for us to 
contemplate forgoing the quest for an alternative metaphor altogether. The 
advantage to metaphor is that it allows us to understand one experience in 
terms of another, but the precision with which law must be applied requires 
concrete, meticulous explanations. Metaphors are useful for clarifying and 
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organizing concepts, but, as shown through this analysis, they may also 
highlight and hide aspects of the concept, which is disadvantageous to 
understanding and applying law.  
Rather than attempting to pinpoint the perfect metaphor, we might 
consider how free speech theory functions based on counterfactual ideals 
for U.S. democracy. The marketplace metaphor, for example, envisions an 
informed citizenry capable of rational thought. As an ideal to strive toward, 
the marketplace of ideas imagines equal citizens with equal access to 
information as well as the ability to sift through information and ultimately 
discover truth. Treated as a possibility or an approach toward the goal of 
equality and justice, the marketplace metaphor ought to function to move us 
closer to the ideal. Past applications of the marketplace metaphor, however, 
assume the ideal already exists. Critical Race Theorists and anti-pornography 
feminists critique the marketplace because it reinforces racist and sexist 
power structures. If the marketplace of ideas is treated as an ideal to strive 
toward, court decisions should be made in an effort to transform the ideal 
into a reality. 
Fish, Bollinger, and Baker attempt to construct free speech theories 
around what they perceive as society’s ideals. With Fish’s literary theory, for 
example, interpretive communities establish goals and then determine which 
speech is allowed. Bollinger creates tolerance as an ideal characteristic that is 
generated through difficult speech interactions. Finally, Baker crafts a theory 
around the goal of self-actualization, permitting speech that promotes self-
understanding and awareness. Despite the shortcomings of literary, tolerance, 
and liberty theory, they provide examples of how to create free speech theory 
based on ideals for U.S. citizenry. Future research should consider how law 
would be applied to difficult cases if the marketplace of ideas theory were 
regarded as an ideal rather than actuality. 
It is also important to consider what analyses of Fish, Bollinger, and 
Baker’s theories indicate about social attitudes regarding racist and sexist 
speech. The application of these theories suggests that people are more 
prepared to accept hate speech regulations than restrictions on pornography. 
Furthermore, the theories are more adequately equipped, and therefore easier 
to apply to, the issue of racist speech than pornography. It is imperative that 
we question why legal theory is more apt to recognize and deal with the harms 
of racist speech than sexist speech. Historically, obscenity was defined as a 
religio-moral offense just as blasphemy and teaching false doctrine. Of the 
original six religio-moral offenses, obscenity is the only remaining offense 
that the government regulates.4 Thomas L. Tedford and Dale A. Herbeck 
4 The six religio-moral heresies, as outlined by Tedford and Herbeck, are: 1) false 
doctrine; 2) irreverent expression; 3) profane and disgusting speech; 4) sexual 
communications of a sensual and erotic nature; 5) scientific opinion and fact, 
including sex education materials and challenges to church dogma concerning 
earth and life sciences; and 6) nonconforming views on private morality. 
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explain, “In the United States, obscenity is the last religio-moral heresy to 
be suppressed by government authority on behalf of the nation’s majority 
religion” (163). As Tedford and Herbeck allude to, obscenity is not excluded 
from protection because of the harms it does to women but because it is 
considered a moral issue. Could it be that our society accepts racism as a 
political problem but still views sexism as a cultural and/or personal issue? If 
we accept that law aids in the construction of social norms, we must consider 
the way we discuss the possibility of law. The way we imagine law reflects 
our imagined possibilities for social change.  
Challenging existing norms is a vital part of perpetuating change and a 
primary justification for First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. 
However, it is possible that the speech/action discussion is a distraction 
that hinders the effectiveness of the racist speech and pornography debate. 
All three theories argue that speech and action are conflated. Each theorist 
grants that certain acts speak. However, in order to fully address racist speech 
and anti-pornography arguments, it is necessary to consider how closely 
speech/action is tied to the effect. Lawrence III provides an example of a gay 
man being called a “faggot” on a San Francisco subway. He explains that 
counterspeech is useless due to its instant and irrevocable effect:
Like the word “nigger” and unlike the word, “liar,” it is 
not sufficient to deny the truth of the word’s application, to 
say, “I am a faggot.” One must deny the truth of the word’s 
meaning, a meaning shouted from the rooftops by the rest 
of the world a million times a day. The complex response 
“Yes, I am a member of the group you despise and the 
degraded meaning of the word you use is one that I reject” 
is not effective in a subway encounter. (Lawrence III 70)  
Critical Race Theory makes clear that racist speech obstructs the 
possibility for counterspeech. In other words, the effect of racist speech is 
immediate, and, therefore, leaves little room for response. However, those 
who argue against regulations on speech claim the possibility for rebuttal 
is always present and even necessary. Basically, the absolutist argument 
detaches the speech from the effect in a way that creates space for response. 
For example, Bollinger’s tolerance theory proposes that racist speech is 
necessary to promote tolerant reactions. This implies that victims of racist 
speech have the ability and the opportunity to react in a tolerant manner. The 
issue of pornography is further complicated because the message is visual. 
Those who insist counterspeech is always possible have the difficult task of 
figuring out how one resignifies and counters images. Baker’s liberty theory 
not only assumes that women have the ability to respond to pornography; 
according to this theory restricting pornography actually limits women’s 
individual autonomy. 
It is clear that legal theory must move beyond the speech/action debate 
in order to explore whether the effects of racist and sexist speech are 
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immediate. Such distinctions are necessary for making important decisions 
regarding whether space should be carved out for hate speech or pornography 
regulations.  As legal theorists discuss the possibilities of law, it is essential 
that they look reflexively at how changes reflect and influence social attitudes 
regarding racist and sexist speech. The marketplace of ideas theory must be 
sold. It is time to imagine a new paradigm for freedom of speech that more 
fully addresses how law ought to deal with difficult cases such as pornography 
and racist speech. 
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